States Living in Glasshouses...:
The Effect of Domestic Insurgency on How Countries Vote in the UN Human Rights Council [*]

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Abstract

How do conflicts within a country's borders affect its behavior beyond them? We argue that engaging in counterinsurgencies domestically shapes a country's human rights posture at the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC; previously the UNCHR). Countries suppress insurgencies using methods that violate their international human rights commitments. They are, therefore, cautious of condemning other countries' treatment of their own citizens in anticipation of condemnation of their own actions, and of establishing precedents that could be used by activists at home seeking to hold armed forces accountable for human rights allegations. Therefore, we argue these states will vote against or abstain from resolutions that isolate individual states for human rights transgressions. We analyze country voting patterns at the UNHRC from 1973 till 2013 for those resolutions that target specific countries for human rights violations. We find that countries countering an insurgency are less likely to vote in favor of a resolution targeting another country. The quantitative analysis is augmented with a case study of India and its insurgency problem in Jammu and Kashmir.

Introduction

The study of insurgencies has grown rapidly in comparative politics and IR scholarship. However, the focus of most previous work has been the strategies and tactics that governments use to combat insurgents (Lyall and Wilson 2009), with secondary attention given to the effect such fighting has on state capacity and governance. In

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contrast, the effect of the experience of internal conflict on a country's foreign policies is essentially ignored. In this article, we argue that states engaged in internal civil conflict vote differently in multilateral human rights fora than those that do not face domestic challenges to the state's legitimacy. Simply put, whether or not a civil conflict is ongoing is an important determinant of foreign policy that needs to be included in our analyses.

Conflict data for the post-WWII era show that the most common form of violence is internal conflict within the state (Gates et al. 2016). Over 200 insurgencies in over 40 countries have been recorded from 1945 to 2012 (CFR 2013). The prevalence of insurgencies across time and space has generated in-depth scholarship on substate conflict.[1] However, the impact of insurgencies on a country's foreign policy decisions has not been adequately examined.

The need for this inquiry is illustrated nicely by India's puzzling voting behavior in multilateral human rights fora such as the UN Human Rights Council (previously the UN Commission on Human Rights). A signatory to the UN Charter even prior to independence, India prides itself as an advocate and supporter of the multilateral global rules order and has an admirable voting record when it comes to supporting resolutions advocating for human rights around the world. But, a closer look at the data reveals a puzzling pattern: while India is a dependable 'yay' vote on UNHRC resolutions that condemn general human rights violations globally, it almost always abstains or votes

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1. For a classification of civil warfare and its impact on duration, see Kalyvas (2005) and Balcells and Kalyvas (2014). For effective state counterinsurgency strategies, see Galula (2006). For rebel strategies, see Weinstein (2006). For a comparison of why a non-state actor's nonviolent resistance is more successful than violent resistance, see Stephan and Chenoweth (2008). For an analysis of state reaction to separatist movements see Butt (2017). The discussion of the role (or lack thereof) of identity politics in substate violence can be found in Brubaker (2009), Byman (1998), Cederman et al. (2010), Fearon and Laitin (2003), Mueller (2000), Posen (1993). The impact of the nature of regime type on the effectiveness of counterinsurgency is discussed by Lyall (2010).

'nay' on any resolution that singles out a specific country for human rights violations. Why?

We contend that India's reluctance to support resolutions targeting specific countries arises from a vulnerability of being targeted in the same manner for the extra-constitutional methods that the Indian armed forces use to suppress insurgencies, many of which arguably violate its international human rights commitments.[2] Thus, India is cautious of condemning other countries' treatment of their own citizens in anticipation of international condemnation of its own actions. India is afraid of being singled out for its own human rights violations while countering domestic insurgencies if it chooses to point fingers at other countries.

This logic can be expanded to apply to all states that have to deal with insurgencies. States need to make sure that they do not give other states any reason to single them out, both for the sake of their international reputation and to save face with domestic audiences. Thus, states need to be wary of casting stones at other's glasshouses lest their targets return the favor.

The article is organized as follows. We examine first the literature on human rights and international organizations, which helps illustrate the novelty of our puzzle. Second, we provide a theoretical framework to explain the relationship between countering insurgencies and voting on human rights resolutions that target specific countries. Third, we present our data, methods, and principal findings. The penultimate section illus-

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2. For example, in addition to the universal principles upheld in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), India ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1979. The ICCPR outlines a whole range of human rights that states need to guarantee their citizens. Rights during times of emergency are also outlined, such as "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" (Article 7).

trates the mechanisms at work through a case study of the impact of India's handling of the insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir on Indian foreign policy. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our study for foreign policy analysis.

Human Rights and International Organizations

Why do states sign human rights agreements (HRAs)? There have been different answers put forward to this question. Leaders may sign on to HRAs to commit their countries to following human rights to ensure successful democratization (for fear of future governments overturning such a guarantee of human rights) (Moravcsik 2000; Landman 2005). Evidence to the contrary also exists with the lack of an obvious lock-in effect for the Convention Against Torture (Goodliffe and Hawkins 2006). Some have argued that the lock-in mechanism is not sufficient and that local capacity and regime type also matters when it comes to successful implementation (Cole 2005; Grewal and Voeten 2015). Variation in the type of national legal systems may also have an impact on a state's choice to sign an agreement (Stein 2016).

A healthy body of literature exists on the politics of "naming and shaming" states for their human rights violations. Transnational advocacy networks aim to hold states accountable for their human rights abuses (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse-Kappen et al. 1999; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Countries that are called out for their human rights violations by international organizations and non-governmental organizations suffer negative consequences like reduced levels of foreign aid, FDI flows, and exports in the case of repressive regimes(Lebovic and Voeten 2009; Barry, Chad Clay, and Flynn 2013; Peterson, Murdie, and Asal 2016). "Naming and shaming" leads to an improve-

ment in human rights practices conditional on factors like the presence of human rights organizations within the country under scrutiny as well as external pressure from other states, individuals, and organizations (Murdie and Davis 2012). It has also helped reduce the severity of genocides and politicides (Krain 2012). However, some evidence to the contrary also exists. The effectiveness of this strategy can be for a limited duration, as witnessed in the case of Latin American countries, or non-existent by some measures (Franklin 2008; Hafner-Burton 2008). Others argue that procedural redressal mechanisms in international human rights institutions have a better track record at improving human rights conditions than targeted resolutions since the latter are aimed at the most egregious human rights violations, which might be harder to fix (Cole 2012).

In the case of the UNCHR/UNHRC, have countries altered their behavior in response to international condemnation received for their human rights violations? UNCHR resolutions against specific states for human rights violations did not necessarily see a reduction in human rights violations afterwards. In fact, targeted states often expanded their use of political terror (Hafner-Burton 2008). Indeed, replacing the UNCHR with the UNHRC was meant to address the perceived politicization and ineffectualness of the Commission. However, based on the Council's pattern of resolutions, there does not seem to be a marked improvement (Hug and Lukács 2014).

Countries tend to vote in accordance with their "bloc" membership. Blocs have been interpreted in multiple ways across time but broadly represent a group of states with a common agenda. The nature of the bloc may vary depending on contemporary circumstances but there seems to be some evidence for consistent voting patterns for EU and OIC members at the UNHRC (Holloway 1990; Hug and Lukács 2014; Smith 2006). However, blocs may matter less than the influential presence of the US on the

Council. The US has a great impact on outcomes at the UNHRC (J. M. Voss 2013).

Resolutions on specific countries may also be a political act of alienating target countries in the international community, wherein states sponsoring such resolutions (and the voting blocs to which they belong) do not necessarily have better human rights records than the targets they attack (Hug 2014). However, the UNHRC's targeted resolutions have important unintended economic consequences. If a UNHRC resolution targets a specific country, FDI flows to that targeted country are reduced (Vadlamannati, Janz, and Berntsen 2018). This is an interesting finding given that investors tend not to punish states for their human rights violations if they participate in multiple human rights regimes (Garriga 2016). Thus, UNHRC resolutions also act as signals to other international actors and inform decisions outside the realm of human rights redressal.

Signaling is an important aspect of state behavior in international institutions. Sometimes the act of signing agreements or voting on human rights resolutions in a particular manner is itself the end goal for a state that wishes to signal its intentions to either (or both) international and domestic audiences. Lebovic and Voeten (2006) argue that the UNHRC has increasingly over time been used as a forum in which countries are "named and shamed" for their human rights violations, especially after the end of the Cold War. They assert that while realist calculations cannot be entirely dismissed, reputation costs do seem to exist with voting behavior that fails to take human rights violations seriously. Extending their logic on reputation, adopting a positive human rights stance acts as a signaling mechanism for states that wish to be seen as credible internationally. For example, autocracies are more inclined to sign on to the UN Convention Against Torture because such a gesture appeases internal opposition to the

regime (Vreeland 2008). While such deliberately strategic behavior in international human rights organizations has been criticized, the politicization of human rights redressal mechanisms is not inherently problematic. In fact, it can be effective in bringing about transformations in human rights practices. The UNHRC's Universal Periodic Review has resulted in countries implementing changes when states that are friends and allies raise valid criticisms of human rights practices, while ignoring their adversaries' recommendations (Terman and Voeten 2018). Thus, human rights agreements are signaling mechanisms.

How do states signal their intentions to both international and domestic audiences while voting at the UNHRC? In the theoretical framework presented in the next section, we assert that states aim to signal their support for human rights but domestic security considerations constrain them. In line with the logic of domestic considerations affecting international outcomes, we claim that there has been no systematic analysis of the impact of domestic insurgencies on international human rights resolutions. More specifically, do countries that are fighting insurgencies within their borders vote against or abstain from condemning human rights violations by other state governments *vis-à-vis* their own citizens? There has been little effort to link violence at the domestic level to institutional participation at the international level. Our argument examines the effect of insurgencies on foreign policy decision-making while taking into account both international and domestic audiences.

Argument: Domestic Insurgency Constrains International Human Rights Commitments

The impact of insurgencies on foreign policy is important to evaluate in the light of a state's international commitments. First, what exactly counts as an insurgency? For the purpose of this article, we adopt *The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual's* definition that an insurgency comprises "organized, protracted politico-military struggles" that aim to either overthrow the current social order or government in order to replace it or secede from the state to establish a separate political entity. Insurgencies often involve violent clashes between the insurgent groups and the government. Civilians caught in the cross-fire also contribute to some of the casualties (Corps 2007, pp. 2-3).

Second, how does countering insurgencies domestically affect a state's foreign policy? We believe that voting patterns at the UN Human Rights Council (previously the UN Commission on Human Rights) on targeted resolutions will be an effective indicator to evaluate whether there is a difference between countries facing insurgencies and those that are free of insurgencies. It is expected that, on average, states countering domestic insurgencies will vote against or abstain from resolutions that isolate individual states for human rights transgressions against their citizens. We contend that countries often use extra-constitutional methods to suppress insurgencies. Such methods include extra-judicial killings, rape, and illegal incarceration of dissidents, all of which violate their international human rights commitments.[3] Thus, a country dealing with an insurgency is cautious of condemning other countries' treatment of their own citizens in

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3. For example, 168 countries are party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (came into force in 1976). The ICCPR outlines a range of human rights that states need to guarantee their citizens. Rights during times of emergency are also outlined, such as "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" (Article 7).

anticipation of international condemnation of its own actions.[4]

In addition to worrying about international condemnation of tactics targeting insurgents, a state has to negotiate with interested parties domestically, which in turn determines its bargaining range internationally (Putnam 1988). Thus, greater demand by the armed forces for protection from human rights violation charges while fighting insurgencies might constrain how a state handles international human rights violations. States wish to appear as legitimate and responsible to their international audience, so have to strike a balance between their domestic actions and their international stance on human rights. Therefore, a state is probably less inclined to condemn another state for human rights transgressions if it fears being held to the same standards at an international forum. Since the UNHRC is one of the few forums in which single country resolutions are repeatedly brought up, it forms an ideal setting for testing patterns of voting behavior based on each state's domestic insurgency situation (or lack thereof).[5]

Founded in 2006, the UNHRC has 47 members that are elected to represent their region for a term of three years.[6] Its predecessor the UNCHR was founded in 1946 and replaced by the UNHRC in 2006. Since both entities serve the same purpose in the UN system and one replaced the other in order to improve its effectiveness and credibility (Hug and Lukács 2014), we believe that our argument applies across both

4. An implication of the argument is that, if the intensity of the insurgency increases, we would expect its impact on altering voting behavior to be greater. We provide evidence for this proposition in the online appendix.

5. There is an important distinction between voting on resolutions at the UNHRC and the UNHRC's Universal Periodic Review (UPR). Targeted resolutions are aimed at specific countries in order to shame them in a public forum. The UPR, in contrast, is not a process that specifically targets any one country – it is a process that allows all countries to comment on human rights issues of all other countries. Our theory does not apply in the case of the UPR because states need not fear being shamed individually to defend themselves in a public forum for their transgressions.

6. There were 53 members when it was still the UN Commission on Human Rights but it switched to 47 members after becoming the Council in 2006.

of these UN human rights bodies. After two terms in office, a country has to sit out for one year before standing for elections again. An examination of UNCHR/UNHRC elections since 1946 shows that the most powerful states in each grouping have consistently been elected to the Council with rotating membership for the smaller countries.

We presume that countries wish to have all options on the table when dealing with insurgencies. Very often, the branches of government handling insurgencies will lobby for greater leeway in suppressing insurgencies. Regardless of whether or not a state is democratic, it will look to quell insurgent opposition using the most efficient means available since any threat to the state's sovereignty is a security threat to the state. Keeping this in mind, states will be reluctant to point fingers at other countries for their human rights transgressions in a public forum since their own transgressions could potentially be brought up in the same forum. States would prefer to not have their human rights record publicized in order to not lose international credibility. States are subsequently constrained in their voting options on targeted resolutions at the UNHRC if they are handling an insurgency. Thus, insurgency-ridden states are more likely to abstain or vote against resolutions targeting a specific country alone.[7]

Hypothesis: Countering domestic insurgencies increases the likelihood of voting against or abstaining from resolutions that condemn individual countries for human rights violations.

We describe below our research design for testing this hypothesis.

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7. It is important to note that our theory is not the same as the transactional principle of reciprocity in diplomacy as defined in Berridge and Lloyd (2012). We are not arguing that an action of condemnation will result in a reciprocal reaction as retaliation. Reciprocity can be a diplomatic bargaining tool that states use to negotiate votes on resolutions. Our argument takes a step back to theorize why any state countering an insurgency would choose to vote in a particular way regardless of engaging with such a diplomatic tool.

Data

The data for our paper span both the Commission (UNCHR) and the Council (UNHRC) from 1973 to 2017. The dependent variable is the votes cast by members of these fora on country-specific resolutions in a given year. It takes on a value of 1 if the votes are in favor of the resolution (a "yes" vote) and a value of 0 if the votes are against the resolution (a "no" vote) or if members chose to abstain from voting on the resolution.[8] We club abstentions and nay votes together because we believe that they signal the same intention *vis-à-vis* targeted resolutions as compared to affirmative votes – both indicate a lack of willingness to support a targeted resolution.[9] For the given time span, there are 47 target countries for such resolutions.[10]

Our main explanatory variable indicates whether or not a member of the UNCHR/UNHRC is dealing with an insurgency in a given year. We measure this variable in two ways: first, with a measure of substate violence based on battle deaths; second, with a measure of whether or not a separatist/autonomist movement exists. The data for the former are drawn from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Version 4-2016). The variable Insurgency is coded as 1 for those years in which battle deaths are greater than

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8. For the UNCHR, our data are drawn from Lebovic and Voeten with our own coding for the years of 2002-2005 (Lebovic and Voeten 2006). For the UNHRC, we utilize both M. Joel Voss' data (2016) and Erik Voeten's data (2018).

9. We provide multinomial logit models in our appendix in tables A1 and A2 with yes, no, and abstain votes as three separate categories. Our findings show that there is no significant difference between abstentions and no votes while there is a significant difference between abstentions and yes votes. Our overall hypothesis that countries countering insurgencies are less likely to vote in favor of targeted resolutions is still upheld.

10. We are only using those resolutions that were contested and put to a vote and not those that were passed with a consensus because consensus resolutions evenly distribute the collective burden of decision-making. Countries do not need to individually stand out and explain their position. If responsibility is diffused, then states do not need to deliberate as much on the potential repercussion that they might face individually. Resolutions that are put to a vote are better tools for parsing out variation in voting preferences since they involve each country assuming the limelight to cast its vote and justify its decision. A country's vote can alter the outcome of the resolution. Thus, states are more conscious of how they choose to vote. Also, some of the resolutions are merely related to providing technical assistance on certain human rights issues but even these do not garner unanimous support.

or equal to 25 and 0 for years that fall below this threshold for substate violence in which at least one of the actors is the government (Themnér 2014).[11] The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data on the existence of separatist/autonomous movements are used for our second measure of Insurgency. The value ranges from 0 to 1 based on the average of experts labeling a given country as being affected by separatist/autonomous movements.[12] It is important to note that countries fighting insurgencies in areas beyond their territorial borders are not relevant for our research question, since attacking non-citizens has a different dynamic than attacking people a state counts as its own citizens.[13] Thus, insurgencies being fought outside of a state's international boundaries will not count towards the years a state is involved in an insurgency.

Both the UNCHR and the UNHRC are infamous for the disproportionate number of resolutions that are raised against Israel.[14] In our data, Israel is the target for 31.11% of the resolutions, which is 23.43 percentage points higher than the next most targeted county (Iran). In order to account for this, we have included a dummy variable for those resolutions that target Israel specifically. Resolutions on Israel have their own distinct character compared to other resolutions because most of the developing world views Israel's relationship with Palestine through the lens of colonization. Therefore, postcolonial countries vote in favor of resolutions that target Israel as a signal of their support for decolonization movements.

11. The data of concern for us are drawn from Conflict Type 3 and 4 from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset.

12. Refer to the *V-Dem Codebook v8*, pp.178-9, for further details. Our appendix reports robustness checks with other measures of insurgency and conflict intensity. Our hypothesis is upheld across different specifications of these variables.

13. Fighting insurgencies outside one's own borders involves bargaining with international actors and the conflict can acquire an inter-state dynamic, for example, the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in the early 2000s. Fighting an external adversary using inhumane methods can, therefore, be justified by a state as unpleasant means to defeat an outside power. However, domestically, the same methods are not as easily justifiable when the state itself is meant to be responsible for the lives of its citizens.

14. For more information on this trend across both bodies, see Hug (2014).

Voting preferences at UNHRC are also driven by other considerations. For instance, some of the factors that need to be controlled while ascertaining voting behavior are alliances with great powers. Great powers can use incentives to make countries vote against their preferences. We code a binary variable for members who have defence pacts with the United States since the US might put more pressure on such countries to vote in favor of targeted resolutions against countries that the US wants to shame internationally. During the Cold War, each bloc may have influenced its allies to vote in specific ways, which may have aligned with their own interests and been at the expense of human rights. We employ a control for the Cold War (a binary variable coded '1' for the Cold War and '0' otherwise). We also utilize an alliance dummy variable from the COW Formal Alliances data set (v.4.1) for countries that have a defense treaty with the United States, which might influence their voting in favor of targeted resolutions (Gibler 2009). An alternative measure to military alliances that we use as a robustness check is Bailey et al.'s measure of the degree to which a state agrees with the US when casting its vote at the UN General Assembly. The scale runs from 0 to 1 where 0 indicates a state never voting the same as the US while 1 indicates a state always voting in the same pattern as the United States (Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017).

As mentioned earlier, bloc voting is often cited as explaining vote patterns at the UNCHR / UNHRC. Bloc memberships can exert pressure on countries to stick to a specific agenda. Some regional groups are more concerned about issues of human rights than others. For instance, the European Union (EU) has stringent rules of membership that include certain human rights standards. Thus, being a member of the EU might influence voting strongly in favor of human rights. In contrast, certain other groups might shield some states from accusations of human rights violations while targeting

other states. For instance, members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) often sponsor resolutions that favor Palestine and condemn Israel.[15] Dummy variables for EU or OIC membership have been introduced to control for these effects.

Voting behavior may also be a factor of how states position themselves within a US-led liberal international order. States that are more *status quoist* may be more likely to condemn other states for their human rights violations while states that are dissatisfied with their contemporary international order may be less inclined to condemn other states for their transgressions. In order to capture a state's orientation towards the US-led international order, we use Bailey et al.'s (2017) ideal point data. Ideal point estimates based on UN General Assembly votes range from 1946 until 2015 in our data (Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017).

Russia and China are significant examples of states that are known for their human rights violations but have never had a resolution sponsored against them. Since the P-5 have disproportionate influence in the UN system, with a veto in the UN Security Council, these countries know that they can vote on other countries with impunity. Thus, their voting behavior is not constrained by their own human rights violations. We, therefore, consider a P-5 dummy control for these countries as useful.

Whether or not a country strongly condemns another country for its actions may also depend on how closely linked the two countries are, especially in terms of trade. The greater the volume of trade between a member country and a target country, the less likely a member country will vote in favor of a public resolution against the target

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15. For instance, in the June 2015 session, Pakistan, on behalf of the OIC, sponsored a resolution on "Ensuring accountability and justice for all violations of international law in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem."

country. Accounting for such strong relationships between states is a measure of annual bilateral trade volume from the Correlates of War Project Trade Data Set (Barbieri and Keshk). The data span the years of 1973-2014.[16]

The democratic or autocratic nature of a government may also determine how countries vote on resolutions. Democratic countries that uphold transparency and greater accountability may be more inclined to condemn other countries for human rights violations in comparison to autocratic states that are more supportive of obfuscating domestic politics. Our variable Authoritarian categorizes countries as democracies (0), anocracies (1), and autocracies (2) as per the Polity IV guidelines (Marshall and Jaggers 2000). We should see a negative relationship between our dependent variable and being authoritarian.[17] A dramatic change in a country's regime type may also impact voting behavior. We believe that a swing towards becoming more authoritarian can result in more repressive state measures. Therefore, we coded a binary variable for autocratic regime change, which takes on a value of 1, for a drop in a country's polity score from one year to the next that is greater than 3.

Targets of resolutions may themselves be members of the UNCHR/UNHRC. In such instances, the dynamic between voting states and the target state might be different than those cases in which the target state is absent from the resolution's proceedings. It seems less likely for members to vote in favor of targeting another member state. We control for such circumstances by adding a binary variable that identifies target states as member state as well. Furthermore, a state that has been targeted in a given year and is a member of the UNCHR/UNHRC may be more wary of targeting other states. We

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16. We also conduct a robustness check by substituting COW bilateral trade data with UN Comtrade data; these results can be found in the appendix.

17. As a robustness check, we use various other democratic measures from the V-Dem dataset. Our findings do not change. These results are in the appendix.

have created a variable to identify such voting states that are also targets in a given year.

We include a linear time trend to control for whether states are increasingly more inclined to condemn other states for human rights violations as the years pass and norms on human rights evolve.

Finally, we note transparently that we do not include controls for a country's own human rights record as proxied by existing cross-national measures of state repression or violations of physical integrity. Our reasoning is simple: when states are fighting insurgencies, our argument is that they are more likely to violate human rights, a proposition borne out by a simple t-test that shows that human rights scores are lower in these countries than in their peaceful counterparts.[18] Controlling for the human rights score of a country therefore would be controlling for a causal posterior, which we would prefer not to do.

Analysis

The principal test of our hypothesis that countering domestic insurgencies decreases the likelihood of voting in favor of resolutions that condemn specific countries for human rights violations involves the three logit models that are shown in Table 1 and Table 2. The unit of analysis for all our model specifications is a directed dyad wherein country i is a member of of the UNCHR/UNHRC and country j is the target of a resolution. The standard errors for our models are clustered by the member states that vote at the

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18. We use the PHYSINT measure from Cingranelli and Richards (2014), which ranges from 0 ("no respect for physical integrity") to 8 ("full respect"). In our sample, the average for peaceful countries is 5.20, while the average for countries facing domestic insurgency is 1.78. This difference is statistically significant at p< 0.001.

UNCHR/UNHRC.

Table 1 depicts our findings with our measure of insurgency defined in terms of the presence or absence of substate conflict while Table 2 shows our three models with insurgency as a narrow measure of the presence or absence of separatist/autonomist movements in a given year. Our first and basic model depicts the impact of domestic insurgencies on voting behavior in the starkest case while controlling for resolutions on Israel and time. Our argument would expect us to find a statistically significant negative relationship between insurgencies and voting. A country countering an insurgency is less likely to vote in favor of a resolution that specifically targets another country. This seems to be the case with the effect of insurgencies on voting being negative and highly statistically significant.

The second model expands on the basic one and accounts for the alternative explanations that are stated above. After controlling for other explanations, we test whether the impact of countering insurgencies on voting behavior stands up to scrutiny. We find that the impact of insurgencies is still negative on voting and statistically significant at the 0.01 level for both measures of insurgency in model 2. As for the alternative explanations, the authoritarian nature of a government and whether the member state is also a target in a given year are both statistically significant with negative relationships with voting, as expected. Surprisingly, regime change towards becoming more autocratic, bilateral trade, and defense alliances with the US do not seem to have a major impact on voting behavior. Bloc voting or being members of the EU and OIC also do not have a significant effect on voting.

The third model is a replication of the second model after excluding the resolutions

that target Israel in order to see whether the disproportionate Israel resolutions are somehow affecting the results. We expect that without Israel resolutions, our claim should be strengthened since voting patterns on Israel are often based on a long history of anti-colonial rhetoric or bloc-voting agendas.[19] We observe that this is indeed the case with the relationship between insurgencies and voting remaining negative and statistically significant. It is interesting to note that after dropping resolutions on Israel, a voting state's ideal point estimate becomes statistically significant with a positive relationship with voting. Such a relationship is consistent with the expectation that countries that are more aligned with the US-led liberal world order will be more likely to vote in favor of targeted resolutions concerning human rights.

Across the various specifications of our models, we find that countering an insurgency is consistently a statistically significant factor that makes it less likely for states to vote in favor of targeted resolutions. Our models comparing alternative explanations (and using different specifications) uphold our main hypothesis that countering domestic insurgencies increases the likelihood of voting against or abstaining from resolutions that single out and condemn countries for human rights violations at the UNCHR/UNHRC.[20]

The quantitative evidence proffered above bolsters confidence in our theoretical argument. But it falls short of demonstrating that the mechanisms linking insurgency to international human rights postures are plausible. In the next section we use a case study of India's involvement in its northern territory of Jammu & Kashmir to elucidate our logic.

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19. For example, the OIC, which constantly raises resolutions against Israel.
20. Please refer to the Appendix for a comprehensive set of robustness checks.

Table 1: Relationship Between Insurgencies and Voting Behavior Based on Number of Battle Deaths

Vote (1=Yes 0=No/Abstain)	(1) Vote	(2) Vote	(3) Vote	(4) Vote	(5) Vote
Insurgency	-0.472***	-0.291**	-0.475***	-0.294**	-0.473***
	(-5.48)	(-3.23)	(-3.47)	(-3.23)	(-3.58)
Israel	0.540*	0.223		0.224	
	(2.44)	(1.01)		(1.02)	
Time trend	0.00251	0.0305***	0.0270**	0.0303***	0.0281**
	(0.63)	(4.73)	(3.06)	(4.64)	(3.22)
Ideal point		0.0433	0.535***	0.0230	0.546***
		(0.36)	(3.51)	(0.31)	(5.95)
Percentage Agree with US		-0.172	0.198		
		(-0.36)	(0.21)		
P5		-0.294*	-0.845***	-0.308*	-0.824***
		(-2.50)	(-4.35)	(-2.53)	(-4.03)
EU member		-0.0617	0.350	-0.0605	0.349
		(-0.42)	(1.62)	(-0.41)	(1.62)
OIC member		-0.157	-0.319*	-0.168	-0.294
		(-1.25)	(-2.16)	(-1.39)	(-1.89)
Authoritarian		-0.171*	-0.198*	-0.180*	-0.175*
		(-2.42)	(-2.45)	(-2.57)	(-2.21)
Autocratic regime change		-0.119	-0.181	-0.118	-0.188
		(-0.63)	(-0.70)	(-0.63)	(-0.73)
Target is HRC member		-0.558***	-0.635***	-0.558***	-0.635***
		(-6.67)	(-8.09)	(-6.69)	(-8.01)
Cold War		0.730***	0.648*	0.737***	0.648**
		(3.96)	(2.48)	(4.34)	(2.85)
Bilateral trade flow		-0.0000154	-0.0000107	-0.0000155	-0.0000109
		(-1.58)	(-1.61)	(-1.58)	(-1.71)
Voting state is a target		-0.0836	-0.207	-0.0852	-0.200
		(-0.73)	(-1.41)	(-0.75)	(-1.34)
US security alliance				-0.0423	0.120
				(-0.40)	(0.80)
Constant	0.367***	-0.103	0.173	-0.114	0.119
	(3.75)	(-0.35)	(0.39)	(-0.43)	(0.34)
Observations	14491	11378	7802	11378	7802

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 2: Relationship Between Insurgencies and Voting Behavior Based on Separatist/Autonomist Movements

Vote (1=Yes 0=No/Abstain)	(1) Vote	(2) Vote	(3) Vote	(4) Vote	(5) Vote
Separatist/Autonomist Movement	-0.519*	-0.477**	-0.629**	-0.463**	-0.626**
	(-2.47)	(-2.79)	(-2.79)	(-2.66)	(-2.71)
Israel	0.532*	0.224		0.228	
	(2.40)	(1.02)		(1.04)	
Time trend	0.00399	0.0308***	0.0280**	0.0313***	0.0298**
	(0.99)	(4.70)	(3.01)	(4.68)	(3.28)
Ideal point		0.108	0.640***	0.0555	0.611***
		(0.96)	(4.22)	(0.77)	(6.19)
Percentage agree with US		-0.383	-0.0829		
		(-0.78)	(-0.08)		
P5		-0.351***	-0.958***	-0.382***	-0.957***
		(-3.70)	(-5.79)	(-3.39)	(-4.84)
EU member		-0.00101	0.445	0.00270	0.445
		(-0.01)	(1.91)	(0.02)	(1.88)
OIC member		-0.136	-0.289	-0.153	-0.271
		(-1.15)	(-1.95)	(-1.31)	(-1.72)
Authoritarian		-0.160*	-0.172*	-0.169*	-0.151
		(-2.23)	(-2.03)	(-2.30)	(-1.74)
Autocratic regime change		-0.158	-0.247	-0.159	-0.255
		(-0.83)	(-0.97)	(-0.82)	(-1.00)
Target is HRC member		-0.554***	-0.633***	-0.553***	-0.633***
		(-6.52)	(-7.91)	(-6.49)	(-7.78)
Cold war		0.709***	0.610*	0.736***	0.637**
		(3.81)	(2.31)	(4.25)	(2.80)
Bilateral trade flow		-0.0000169	-0.0000109	-0.0000175	-0.0000113
		(-1.59)	(-1.53)	(-1.60)	(-1.66)
Voting state is a target		-0.0993	-0.223	-0.0988	-0.215
		(-0.88)	(-1.51)	(-0.88)	(-1.44)
US security alliance				-0.0343	0.121
				(-0.32)	(0.80)
Constant	0.319***	-0.0328	0.228	-0.123	0.0833
	(3.43)	(-0.11)	(0.49)	(-0.46)	(0.23)
Observations	14369	11378	7802	11378	7802

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The case of India and Jammu & Kashmir (J&K)

India's insurgency problem is both chronic and geographically vast. Currently there are nearly 40 active insurgent groups in India and there have been approximately 65,678 insurgency-related fatalities recorded since 1994 till 2017 (SATP 2017a, 2017b).[21] A sizable portion of Indian territory is the theatre for insurgency activity and counter-insurgency operations. India labels these zones of conflict as having "law and order problems" (Banerjee 2002), which means that they get assigned as domestic distur-bances.[22] The Indian state fears conceding any political ground to any one of its insurgencies, especially in the case of secessionist movements, since it believes that any concession will set a precedent. India believes that a precedent of conceding political ground can potentially result in a domino effect wherein India could lose vast chunks of its territory to insurgent groups (Butt 2017).

As of today, three major regions of insurgency exist – Jammu and Kashmir in the north, North-East India, and Central India. Jammu and Kashmir has witnessed con-flict since 1947, with both India and Pakistan claiming the state as its own. The world is yet to see any resolution regarding this dispute. Kashmiris have suffered the ad-verse consequences of living in a disputed territory. Consequently, the demand for an independent Kashmiri state has grown stronger over the years. Some of the groups demanding independence have taken up arms to fight the Indian state, and have also found support from Pakistan in terms of personnel and ammunition. Similarly, since Indian independence, India's North-Eastern region has seen armed independence re-sistance from major armed insurgent groups like United Liberations Front of Assam (ULFA) and National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN(K)). Central India is home

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21. Data for left-wing extremism is from 2004 onwards
22. Such a categorization may, in part, explain why there has been no systematic study of the international implications of fighting insurgencies.

to the extreme Left Naxalite insurgency that claims to be fighting for the rights of the poor, especially the tribals. While all three conflict zones are important, we will focus specifically on the case of Jammu and Kashmir in order to trace out a more focused and detailed analysis.

The partition of British India into present-day India and Pakistan in 1947 required kingdoms in the subcontinent to choose either country or stay independent. The Hindu Maharaja of a Muslim-majority Jammu and Kashmir procrastinated on this decision until his hand was forced by a Pakistani-backed Pathan invasion in 1948. Jammu and Kashmir officially acceded to India in exchange for India's defence forces' protection. India and Pakistan fought a war in 1948 over this state and the ceasefire line demarcates what is now known as the Line of Control (LOC) and unofficially marks the international boundary between Indian and Pakistani jurisdiction.[23] In this context of conflict, many Kashmiris aspire for self-determination and believe that they deserve an independent country. An active insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir began in 1989 and is ongoing.[24]. The separatist movement in Kashmir is not a united front and has multiple factions with different vested interests. These internal divisions have allowed the Indian state reason to stall on making any meaningful concession that will help bring about a resolution of the dispute (Cunningham 2011).

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23. In this article, we refer to the regions of Kashmir in Pakistan as Azad Kashmir and the regions in India as Jammu and Kashmir.

24. It must be noted that Jammu and Kashmir comprises three regions - Ladakh, Jammu, and Kashmir. While Ladhakh and Jammu have no irredentist movements, Kashmir is the main location for the insurgency. For more on the subject, see (Behera 2006; Ganguly 1996; Ganguly and Bajpai 1994; Jacob 2014; Schofield 1996, 2000; Varshney 2010)

Kashmir and the Implementation of AFSPA

India's strategy for handling insurgencies involves utilizing both its military and paramilitary forces. Moreover, the powers extended to the armed forces to deal with insurgents allow for major violations of human rights that go against India's international commitments on the issue. For example, the enforcement of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) allows the indiscriminate use of force, arrests and detention without warrants, and immunity for military and paramilitary personnel from civilian courts (India 1958). A modification of the colonial law of Armed Forces Special Powers Ordinance (1942) that was used against the anti-British rule Quit India Movement, AFSPA was first enforced in 1958 in North-East India. In 1983 it was enforced in Punjab (repealed in 1997) and in 1990 it was implemented in Jammu and Kashmir. Thus, this act has been institutionalized as the "go-to" mechanism for fighting insurgencies. In fact, the central government pushed to pass legislation in 1972 to transfer the authority of declaring any region in India as "disturbed" from the state to the central government so as to be able to enforce AFSPA and monitor the situation from New Delhi.[25]

Even when AFSPA is not officially implemented, its provisions seem to *de facto* apply to regions with insurgencies, i.e. the armed forces have a lot of leeway in terms of violating human rights (*The Armed Forces Special Powers Act: Time For A Renewed Debate in India on Human Rights and National Security* 2013). Rape, torture, and forced disappearances are not uncommon in insurgency areas (HRW 2008). Butt argues that the decision to use coercion against separatist movements rests on the perception of the state about whether or not external war is foreseeable in a future where state secession is successful. The degree of coercion against the separatists is a reaction

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25. N.II./102/29/71: Armed Forces (Special Powers) Regulation - 1958. Proposal for further extension for three years i.e. upto 5th April 1975, Ministry of Home Affairs files (MHA), National Archives of India, New Delhi.

to third-party levels of support to the separatist groups. The greater the third-party support, the greater the use of coercion to suppress the separatists (Butt 2017). Thus, India uses coercion because it fears a future war with Kashmir and/or Pakistan and India's level of coercion against Kashmiri separatists is a function of the high level of support Pakistan offers to Kashmiri insurgents.

AFSPA is meant to ensure swift action by the armed forces against insurgents. It also has a mechanism for redressing violations that the Indian armed forces carries out in conflict zones whereby the military itself conducts investigations that are fast tracked in comparison to civil courts. However, the general trend has been one of the armed forces carrying out human rights abuses with impunity. For instance, in 1991, the Indian army was accused of carrying out mass rapes during a search operation in the villages of Kunan and Poshpora in Kashmir. The Indian military denied these allegations and both the government and Press council of India's investigations concluded that the accusations were baseless. However, the case was reopened in 2013 after 50 women got together to represent the victims of the mass rape and the Kashmir High Court finally ordered that compensation be given to the victims (Sarkar 2016). The perpetrators of the crime have not received any punishment. Forced disappearances also occur whereby Kashmir now has a category of women known as "half widows" - those women whose husbands have disappeared and their whereabouts cannot be ascertained. The Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons is an organization that tries to actively draw attention to this issue. They claim that unofficial estimates for disappeared persons from 1989 to 2006 number anywhere between 8,000 - 10,000 (APDP 2017).

AFSPA has come under harsh criticism from both government and non-government

actors internationally. The US State Department's human rights report on India (2013) and Human Rights Watch's report on India (2014) both condemn AFSPA in the strongest terms. Human Rights Watch states "AFSPA, which has been in force for decades in Jammu and Kashmir and India's northeastern states, has provided effective immunity to members of the armed forces for killings of civilians and other serious human rights violations" (HRW 2015). The US State Department asserts that "Authorities used several laws, including part of the criminal procedure code and the AFSPA, to provide legal protection for members of the security forces who were accused of committing human rights abuses" (State Department 2013). Thus, India's domestic actions against insurgencies are being evaluated internationally.

Civilian legal opinion in India has also criticized AFSPA and offered solutions to remedy the loopholes that prevent the armed forces from being persecuted for extrajudicial killings and sexual assault. The central government's Jeevan Reddy Committee formed to review AFSPA said in its report published in 2005 that AFSPA in north-east India needed to be repealed as it had become "symbol of oppression" (Reddy et al. 2005, p.75). The Supreme Court of India appointed a three-member commission (also known as the Hegde Commission) in January 2013 that sought to investigate alleged extrajudicial executions by Indian forces in the state of Manipur. The Hegde Commission found the allegations to be true and asserted that the "gross abuse" of AFSPA had led to these killings (Hegde, Lyngdoh, and Singh 2013, p.95). The Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law (more commonly known as the Justice Verma Committee) (2013) stated that there is an "imminent need to review the continuance of AFSPA and AFSPA-like legal protocols in internal conflict areas" (Verma et al. 2013, p.151). It also recommended that accusations of sexual violence against armed forces in "disturbed areas" did not require the central government's approval before prosecution. Domestic demo-

cratic institutions have, therefore, tried their best to curtail AFSPA. However, AFSPA remains a potent force due to its popularity with the Indian military.

Strong state institutions that enjoy a high degree of legitimacy in the eyes of the public have ensured civilian control of the military in India. Unlike its counterpart in Pakistan, the Indian military has successfully balanced both international and domestic security concerns without becoming politicized (Staniland 2008). The Indian military though plays an important advisory role on matters relating to Jammu and Kashmir. In addition to being a region ridden with an insurgency, Jammu and Kashmir is also the site for two major international boundary disputes between India and Pakistan, as well as between India and China. A substantial portion of the Indian military is stationed to protect the disputed borders along the Line of Control (LOC) with Pakistan and the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China. The region has, therefore, both an international and a domestic conflict zone and has become one of the most militarized places in India.

The Indian military is reluctant to let go of AFSPA because it believes that it fast tracks cases that would take much longer in civilian courts as well as protects members of the military from false accusations of human rights violations. Also, the Indian Army has been dealing with a shortage of officers, which has placed a burden on COIN operations and exacerbated the conditions for the entrenchment of AFSPA (Jones 2008). The belief is that AFSPA allows decisive military action without hesitation in a conflict zone. For instance, on April 9, 2017, members of the Indian army tied an innocent Kashmiri man to the front of their jeep and drove around announcing that this would be the fate of stone-pelters who protested against India (Yasir and Barry 2017). Criminal charges were brought against the army for this incident. However, the army chose to

honor the major in charge of the unit involved in this incident with a Chief of Army Staff's Commendation (COAS) card for "sustained efforts in CI (counter insurgency) operations" (Singh 2017). The Indian army defended this incident as an example of self-defense against local protesters who were attacking an election polling booth. Indian military pushback against pursuing criminal investigations against its officers is a regular feature of incidents of human rights violations in insurgency areas, regardless of whether AFSPA is officially in effect at the time when such violations occur. The Indian government, therefore, has to accommodate demands for not withdrawing AFSPA from its military and present itself as a responsible global power internationally (Chakravarty 2016).

A tension exists between ensuring the status quo of Indian political governance over Jammu and Kashmir and allowing democratic political processes to take their course. While mass protests are a regular feature of Indian democracy in most parts of the country, mass mobilization in Jammu and Kashmir is regularly suppressed with disproportionate use of force (Staniland 2013). Freedom of expression has been severely curtailed due to the Indian state's fear of Jammu and Kashmir's potential secession. While the Indian state aims to ensure regular elections, media censorship is not uncommon. Both the state and the insurgents often target media personalities.[26] An uneasy balance exists between showcasing India's democratic credentials and safeguarding India's political control over Jammu and Kashmir. India's desire to be seen as a legitimate rising power on the global stage makes it even more important for India to be seen as credibly caring about human rights.

26. The use of violence against journalists is common. For instance, Shujaat Bukhari, a veteran journalist and editor of the Kashmiri newspaper *Rising Kashmir*, was shot dead outside his office in Srinagar on June 14, 2018. Those responsible for his murder are as yet unknown. Another example of violence is the Indian police's arrest and physical abuse of Al Jazeera's reporter, Showkat Shafi in 2011 for taking photographs of a protest, see Ali (2018).

India and its International Audience

India cares about its international reputation and how it projects itself in the international arena. Since the time of its independence, the desire to assert an independent foreign policy free from the shackles of a colonial master has been a continuous theme of India's foreign policy (Miller 2013). India's foreign policy has focused on portraying itself as a legitimate democratic global power, regardless of the political party in power. It tries hard to detract from any incident that will tarnish this reputation. As an illustration of this point, India barred a Kashmiri human rights activist from boarding a flight to Geneva to attend the September session at the UNHRC in 2016. Khurram Parvez, the activist in question, is the Chairperson of the Asian Federation Against Involuntary Disappearances (AFAD) and the Program Coordinator for the Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society (JKCCS). He has been outspoken in his criticism of the Indian state's human rights violations in Jammu and Kashmir. On September 14, 2016, Indian immigration authorities detained him for questioning and prevented him from boarding his flight at New Delhi as per their instructions from the Indian Intelligence Bureau. Two days after this incident, he returned to Srinagar, the capital city of Jammu and Kashmir, and was arrested. Though a sessions court dismissed his arrest order on September 20, the state government detained him without bail for 76 days under the Public Safety Act (Bhatnagar 2016). This demonstrates that the Indian state is willing to take extreme measures to prevent exposing its domestic human rights situation internationally .

India's desire to be taken seriously as a global power stands in juxtaposition to its deep insecurity about exposing its human rights violations. The tension between these

two positions is evident when examining India's behavior at the UNHRC. India is very proud of its consistent election to the UNHRC from its region and publicly highlights having won the most number of votes (162) for the Asia-Pacific region in the 2014 round of voting (MEA 2015). However, despite the pride associated with being a member of the UNHRC, since 2006, India has not sponsored a single Human Rights resolution at the UN on any issue of its own accord (not just country-specific resolutions).[27] India has also not joined any of the Council's key joint statements on countries like Egypt, Bahrain, or Syria since 2012. In fact, at the UNHRC, India tends to abstain from or vote against single country resolutions very often for a democracy that claims to value human rights. For example, India has abstained from or voted against targeted resolutions 23.16% times more than Brazil (another rising democratic power) at the UNHRC from 1973-2013.[28]

In 2011, at the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), India chose to abstain from a resolution condemning the deteriorating human rights situation in Syria. However, in the same year, India also chose to vote in favor of a contested resolution for "the promotion and protection of human rights in a multicultural context, including through combating xenophobia, discrimination and intolerance" and in favor of resolutions that promoted setting up regional and national arrangements to promote human rights (UNHRC 2011b, 2011a). Why is that India abstained from voting on a resolution that targeted a specific country for its human rights situation while having no qualms signing on to a general human rights resolutions in the same year?

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27. In contrast, Pakistan is an active sponsor of resolutions, especially on Palestine and Israel. As a member of the OIC, Pakistan often sponsors resolutions on behalf of the OIC bloc.

28. For a comparison in the post-Cold War period, India abstained from or voted against targeted resolutions 46.18% times more than Brazil. The difference between their abstentions/negative votes at just the Council (2006 onwards) is 32.45%.

The answer to this puzzle points at a broader trend in India's voting patterns at the UNHRC. For instance, the following quote was the Indian diplomat's explanation for India's abstention from voting on a resolution on Syria in 2011 at the UNHRC:

India's traditional position on country specific resolutions is well known. We do not regard spotlighting and finger-pointing at a country for human right violations as helpful. We believe that engaging the country concerned in collaborative and constructive dialogue and partnership is a more pragmatic and productive way forward (MEA 2011).

The explicit statement of India's discomfort with isolating countries for their human rights record has a long history. Archival evidence from 1979 shows that internal memos in the Ministry of External Affairs prior to the 36th session of the UN Commission of Human Rights highlight India's position to not favor attempts to isolate Argentina on accusations of "involuntary disappearance" of its citizens. The MEA leadership informs the Indian delegation that "it has always been our position that human rights can best be ensured through national institutions and no useful purpose would be served by holding Argentina culpable at the meetings of the Human Rights Commission."[29]

The reluctance to target other countries indicates that India might be wary of being hauled before the international community for its own human rights violations. India enjoys the position of being a rising power that Western powers perceive as being benign as opposed to being revisionist (Chatterjee Miller 2014). India's strong democratic track record contributes to this perception, which explains why India tries hard

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29. UI/352/3/80: 36th session of HRC briefs for Indian delegation, Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), National Archives of India, New Delhi.

to project its democratic credentials internationally. India has also consistently been an active participant in UN organizations. However, India's counterinsurgency strategies constrain India's desire to present itself as a democratic status quo power that participates in international institutions. India has to practice a balancing act of both not appearing to be an irresponsible rising power and at the same time not coming across as having double standards.

Obviously we do not believe that counterinsurgency concerns are the only factor explaining India's voting behavior at the UNCHR/UNHRC. To add some nuance to our case study, a closer examination of India's voting patterns is useful. For instance, India votes affirmatively on targeted resolutions involving Palestine/Israel, Myanmar, and a few smaller African states. First, if the resolutions are on Israel and Palestine, India has typically voted in favor of Palestine. India shares a historically strong relationship with Palestine. It has always viewed Israel as a colonizer, so supporting Palestine has been a part of India's anti-colonial movement support.[30] Second, religious or domestic sentiments affect voting as well. Positive votes on Myanmar and Palestine are related to domestic Muslim populations that oppose persecution on the basis of Islam (Kumaraswamy 2006) and positive votes for Sri Lanka are related to pressure from the domestic Tamil population. Thus, we acknowledge that factors beyond domestic considerations also need to be taken into account when analyzing voting behavior.

The Indian foreign policy establishment is mostly insulated from public opinion since foreign policy is not a salient topic for elections (Narang and Staniland 2012). However, that does not mean that domestic security concerns do not shape their views.

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30. It is also interesting to note that India could be viewed analogously as a colonizer in the cases of Kashmir and the North-east but the Indian government does not fear this comparison (or does not believe this line of reasoning is credible).

Thus, the way in which the Indian government deals with various insurgencies within its borders affects India's international human rights stance. The Indian state employs a range of methods to handle insurgencies that involve a serious violation of human rights, like the introduction of AFSPA in insurgency areas to the incarceration of political dissidents who might tarnish India's reputation internationally. In turn, India cannot take a strong position on human rights violations in other states for the fear of being held accountable for its own actions. India's rigid position on human rights internationally affects the effectiveness of its attempt to present itself as a responsible rising power in the international system.

Conclusion

Our paper uncovers an hitherto underexplored dimension of the relationship between the experience of fighting domestic insurgency and how countries engage with international human rights fora. We argue that insurgencies, a major concern for many developing countries, affects the manner in which states conduct themselves in international institutions. In this paper we have shown that voting behavior at the UNCHR/UNHRC is influenced by whether or not a member state is countering an insurgency domestically. Countering insurgencies often involves employing measures that violate a state's international human rights commitments. In order to prevent being embarrassed by such violations at the UNCHR/UNHRC, states experiencing domestic conflict are less willing to vote in favor of resolutions that target specific countries. This is effectively a reciprocity arrangement between developing countries seeking to stay out of the limelight in these fora. States countering insurgencies are, therefore, more likely to vote against or abstain from such resolutions. We provide both quantitative and qualita-

tive evidence to uphold our hypothesis that countering domestic insurgencies increases the likelihood of voting against or abstaining from resolutions that condemn individual countries for human rights violations.

Our quantitative analysis provides strong evidence of the significant effect insurgencies have on voting behavior. Compared to other explanations like the tendency of a state to vote with its bloc, strong bilateral trade relations, or alliances with great powers, countering insurgencies offers a better explanation of countries' voting behavior at the UNCHR/UNHRC. Our qualitative evidence parses out the causal story of our argument and delves into India's insurgency problem in Jammu and Kashmir and the manner in which India votes at the UNCHR/UNHRC. We depict how the armed forces use means that violate human rights while carrying out counter-insurgency operations. The Indian military puts pressure on the government to shield its forces from civilian courts. This results in the Indian government being constrained from taking action to redress human rights violations domestically. In turn, India cannot point fingers in any international forum at other states for their human rights violations. Thus, states that are countering insurgencies are reluctant to publicly point fingers at other states because they fear being called out on their human rights violations. Our findings provide support for further investigating the impact of insurgencies on other aspects of foreign policy behavior.

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